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Abstract—This paper describes the winning entry to the
IJCNN 2011 Social Network Challenge run by Kaggle.com.
The goal of the contest was to promote research on real-
world link prediction, and the dataset was a graph obtained
by crawling the popular Flickr social photo sharing website,
with user identities scrubbed. By de-anonymizing much of the
competition test set using our own Flickr crawl, we were able to
effectively game the competition. Our attack represents a new
application of de-anonymization to gaming machine learning
contests, suggesting changes in how future competitions should
be run.
We introduce a new simulated annealing-based weighted
graph matching algorithm for the seeding step of de-
anonymization. We also show how to combine de-anonymization
with link prediction—the latter is required to achieve good
performance on the portion of the test set not de-anonymized—
for example by training the predictor on the de-anonymized
portion of the test set, and combining probabilistic predictions
from de-anonymization and link prediction.
I. INTRODUCTION
KAGGLE.COM—a platform for machine learningcompetitions—ran the IJCNN 2011 Social Network
Challenge for 9 weeks from Nov 8, 2010 through Jan 11,
2011 [18]. The goal of the Social Network Challenge was
to promote research on link prediction. The contest dataset
was created by crawling a large online social network and
partitioning the obtained edge set into a large training set
and a smaller test set of edges augmented with an equal
number of fake edges. Challenge entries were required to be
probabilistic predictions on the test edge set. Node identities
in the released data were obfuscated to prevent cheating.
Of the 119 teams competing in the link prediction task,
we placed first by de-anonymizing a large portion of the test
set and applying a combination of standard machine learning
techniques on the remainder. While our participation in the
challenge raised obvious questions on the propriety of our
methods, our goal was to raise attention to the ever-present
possibility of de-anonymization in such contests.1
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First we
demonstrate that partial crawls of a large real-world online
social network can be effectively de-anonymized, whereas
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1Once we had established a clear lead on the public leaderboard, we
contacted the organizers to inquire about how to proceed, offering to
withdraw if that was deemed to be best. Happily, the organizers found our
method acceptable, and noted its novelty.
prior work studied de-anonymizing complete snapshots of
social networks [26]. We achieve this by focusing on nodes
with high in-degrees for “seeding” the de-anonymization
process. As we explain in Section III-A, the set of high in-
degree nodes is (approximately) preserved even in a snapshot
obtained from a partial crawl.
Second, we formulate seed identification—the first step of
de-anonymization—as a combinatorial optimization problem,
specifically weighted graph matching, in contrast to the
pattern search approaches of [6] and [26]. We then show
how to use simulated annealing to solve this problem. Since
our formulation makes no assumptions specific to the de-
anonymization context, our solution is broadly applicable to
the weighted graph matching problem.
Third, our winning entry, which yielded a combined test
Area Under Curve (AUC) of 0.981, made use of a novel com-
bination of standard link prediction with de-anonymization
to game a popular link prediction contest. Moreover the
link prediction component of our entry was advantaged
by training on the de-anonymized portions of the test set.
While previous applications of de-anonymization have been
to privacy attacks [27], [25], to the best of our knowledge
this is the first application of de-anonymization to gaming a
machine learning contest.
The success of our approach has important consequences
for future machine learning contests particularly in social
network analysis. We argue that while appropriate contest
rules should be used to disincentivize gaming through de-
anonymization, technical measures to detect gaming are
unlikely to be foolproof. Releasing useful social network
graph data that is resilient to de-anonymization remains an
open question.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we describe the competition dataset and our
Flickr dataset crawled for the purposes of de-anonymization.
A. Social network challenge dataset
The challenge graph had 1,133,547 nodes and 7,237,983
edges. An additional 8,960 edges formed the test set; of these,
equal numbers were true edges (withheld from the training
set) and false edges. Test edges were incident on training
set nodes only, making link prediction possible. Of the 1.1m
nodes, only 37,689 had outgoing edges. In the sequel, we will
call these “crawled” nodes. In order to generate a running
leaderboard, a random 20% of the test set was held out to
form a validation set on which entry AUCs were computed.
The final results were calculated on the entire test set.
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User identities were obfuscated in the challenge dataset:
nodes were assigned random numeric IDs. However, dur-
ing the course of the challenge, it was revealed on the
contest forum that the data came from crawling Flickr—
nodes correspond to users of the photo sharing site and
edges correspond to directed friendship relationships. After
completion, we learned that the competition crawl took place
between 21–28 June 2010 [24]. It was also revealed that the
crawl was made in several iterations by initially downloading
random nodes, and subsequently sampling uniformly from
the inbound neighbors of these nodes; that the true test edges
were selected uniformly at random from the crawled set of
edges incident to nodes with degree two or more; and that the
false test edges were rejection sampled to connect a random
crawled node to a random reached node, provided the edge
did not already exist.
Figures 1 and 2 display the in- and out-degree distributions
of the competition training graph, respectively. The heavy
tailed distributions suggest that a small number of nodes have
very large degrees. These nodes form the seed set for the de-
anonymization process below.
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Fig. 1
KAGGLE CHALLENGE GRAPH: IN-DEGREE DISTRIBUTION.
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Fig. 2
KAGGLE CHALLENGE GRAPH: OUT-DEGREE DISTRIBUTION.
B. Flickr crawl dataset
Between mid-December 2010 and mid-January 2011, we
crawled the Flickr social graph in order to de-anonymize the
Kaggle dataset. The crawler was written in Python, using
the Curl library. A total of 2,038,803 nodes were crawled;
these are the nodes that have outgoing edges. The resulting
graph comprises 163,579,517 directed edges on 9,124,801
nodes—significantly larger than the competition dataset. Of
these 9.1m nodes, 7,775,972 have incoming edges.
While unhelpful for de-anonymization and link prediction,
we recorded the true identities of the nodes we crawled. Sim-
ilarly the organizers provided us with the unobfuscated node
IDs for the challenge graph after the contest. Together these
identities allowed us to compare the two partial snapshots of
the Flickr graph after the completion of the contest.
It is only meaningful to compare edges originating from
nodes that have been crawled in both graphs. There were
6,658,755 such edges in the challenge graph, 7,041,554 edges
in our Flickr graph and 6,545,560 of these edges were in
common. Thus 113,195 edges had been deleted since the
Kaggle crawl and 495,994 edges had been added. The cosine
similarity between the two sets of edges is 95.6%.2
Fig. 3
DISTRIBUTION OF RATIOS OF OUT-DEGREE OF KAGGLE NODES TO
CORRESPONDING FLICKR NODES. (TOP ~700 NODES BY OUT-DEGREE.)
III. DE-ANONYMIZATION
De-anonymization of social networks has been well stud-
ied in the security and privacy community. We summarize
the literature in Section VI. Our presentation here follows
Narayanan and Shmatikov [26] closely.
Abstractly, de-anonymization can be formalized as fol-
lows: there is a graph G from which two graphs GT (for
“target”) and GA (for “auxiliary”) are derived via some
stochastic process. There is thus a natural notion of (partial)
correspondence between the nodes of GT and GA; the goal
of de-anonymization is to recover this correspondence.
2Here and in the sequel, the cosine similarity between two sets X and
Y is |X∩Y |√|X|·|Y | .
Fig. 4
DISTRIBUTION OF RATIOS OF IN-DEGREE OF KAGGLE NODES TO
CORRESPONDING FLICKR NODES. (TOP ~700 NODES BY IN-DEGREE.)
The stochastic process involved could be as simple as the
deletion of random edges. At the other extreme, if we’re
considering two entirely different online social networks,
say Facebook and LinkedIn, then G is the underlying social
graph of human relationships, and GT and GA are generated
according to the processes by which users join online social
networks, which has no simple algorithmic description.
In the current instance, G is the Flickr graph at the time
of the Kaggle crawl. The Kaggle graph GT was generated
by crawling, followed by the sampling process described
in Section II. Our graph GA was “generated” from G by
the natural evolution of the Flickr graph since the time of
the Kaggle crawl until the time of our crawl, followed by
crawling. Each of these steps introduces noise and/or bias
into the graphs.
Metrics. We use the metrics accuracy and coverage to
measure the performance of a de-anonymization algorithm.
Accuracy is defined as the fraction of nodes correctly de-
anonymized among all de-anonymized nodes. Coverage is
defined as the fraction of nodes de-anonymized. Specifically,
we are concerned with coverage over the Kaggle test set.
Therefore in the sequel, unless explicitly noted otherwise,
coverage means the fraction of nodes de-anonymized among
the nodes that appeared in the Kaggle test set. We also
adopt a similar notion of edge coverage and edge accuracy
for the Kaggle test set, where the former is defined as the
fraction of edges in the Kaggle test set that have been de-
anonymized, and the latter is defined as the fraction of edges
that are correctly de-anonymized among all edges that are de-
anonymized in the Kaggle test set. An edge is de-anonymized
iff both nodes incident to the edge are de-anonymized.
Overview of our de-anonymization algorithm. Our basic
approach to de-anonymization is described in [26]. Broadly,
there are two steps: “seed identification” and “propagation.”
In the former step we somehow de-anonymize a small
number of nodes, and in the latter step we use these as
“anchors” to propagate the de-anonymization to more and
more nodes. In this step the algorithm feeds on its own
output.
We note some general features of this approach. There
is some similarity with the “seed-and-extend” paradigm for
sequence alignment in bioinformatics [5]. A very small
number of seeds is sufficient to get the algorithm underway;
the number depends on whether or not the seeds are “hubs”
(high-degree nodes) and on the degree of similarity between
the two graphs.
Propagation is somewhat reminiscent of the spread of
epidemics. As this analogy suggests, if there are too few
seeds, then propagation dies out; if there are sufficiently
many, it reaches a large fraction of the nodes. Note, however,
that while epidemics are transmitted from one node to
another, multiple already-mapped pairs of nodes are involved
in implicating a new mapping between a new pair of nodes.
A. Seed identification
As mentioned earlier, seed identification is a bootstrapping
step with the goal of de-anonymizing a small subset of nodes
in the Kaggle graph.
The seed-identification technique in [26] is based on
pattern search, specifically, identifying small cliques based
on degrees and common-neighbor counts. We propose a new
approach to seed identification based on formulating it as a
combinatorial optimization problem. Compared to [26], we
believe our approach is more robust to graph evolution, noise,
and information loss due to the crawler’s sampling process.
Our motivation for developing this new approach stems
primarily from the fact that during the contest, it was unclear
whether the clique search technique would be feasible, since
we did not know how much the graph had evolved between
the two crawls, and how similar the node degrees in the two
graphs were to each other. Although we determined after the
contest that the existing technique would also have worked
in this setting, our method may be of independent interest,
especially in contexts where noise and information loss are
more prominent.
Fig. 5
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN KAGGLE AND FLICKR HIGH IN-DEGREE
NODES.
Search space reduction. Since both graphs contain mil-
lions of nodes, our algorithm needs to effectively reduce the
search space to be viable. Essentially, we would like to find
a small subset of nodes K in the Kaggle graph, and a small
subset of nodes F in the Flickr graph, such that a significant
fraction of nodes in K correspond to nodes in F .
The key observation is that the nodes with high in-degree
in both graphs roughly correspond to each other (whereas
only about 115 of nodes with high out-degree are present in
the Kaggle graph). Figure 5 shows the correspondence: of
the top 30 nodes in the Kaggle graph and the top 30 nodes
in the Flickr graph, there are 27 correspondences; 60 in the
top 80 nodes and 84 in the top 120.
The fact that a rough correspondence exists can be sur-
mised without the benefit of hindsight. If we assume that the
crawled nodes in the Kaggle graph are a random sample of
all nodes, ignoring the changes in the graph between the two
crawls, we can expect that the indegrees of corresponding
nodes in the two graphs will be roughly in the same propor-
tion up to sampling error. Even though the Kaggle nodes are
not a uniformly random sample, the sampling turns out to
be “random enough” for the correspondence to hold.
Graph matching. We now have a small subset of nodes
K from the Kaggle graph, and a small subset of nodes F
from the Flickr graph, with a large fraction of nodes in K
corresponding to nodes in F . Our next step is to find this
correspondence.
First we need a measure of the quality of a candidate
mapping, so that we can optimize that measure over all
possible mappings. If all the edges among the top k nodes
in the Kaggle graph were available, we could look for the
mapping that minimizes mismatches. By mismatch we mean
the existence of an edge between a pair of nodes in one
graph, but not between the images of that pair of nodes in
the other graph. However, since only a (small) subset of the
Kaggle nodes are crawled, most of the edge information is
unavailable.
It turns out that even with a partial crawl, we can adopt a
similar strategy, and in fact do even better than simply look-
ing at edges. The trick is to look at the cosine similarity of the
sets of in-neighbors of a pair of nodes. A similar rationale
as above explains why the cosines between corresponding
node pairs in the two graphs would be roughly equal: if the
Kaggle nodes are a random sample then they would indeed
be equal up to sampling error.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between similarity scores
of corresponding node pairs. Among the top 40 nodes in
the Kaggle and Flickr graphs, there are 32 correspondences;
these two sets of 32 nodes give
(
32
2
)
= 496 pairs of
corresponding unordered node pairs. For each node pair we
have an in-neighbor cosine similarity score; thus, the graph
shows 496 pairs of scores (xi, yi).
The slope is less than 1, i.e., node pairs in the Kaggle graph
have slightly higher scores. This is because the crawled nodes
in the Kaggle graph are more biased towards high-degree
nodes.
We treat the cosine score of a node pair as the weight of an
(undirected) “edge” between those two nodes, regardless of
Fig. 6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIMILARITY SCORES OF CORRESPONDING
NODE PAIRS.
whether or not any actual edges exist between those nodes.
We look for a mapping where the weights of corresponding
edges are as close to each other as possible. This is the
problem of weighted graph matching. As mentioned earlier,
this approach to finding seeds is a global optimization
problem rather than pattern search.
During the contest, we found a seed mapping of 10 nodes
among the top 20 nodes (there are in fact 18 corresponding
pairs of nodes among the top 20s) by visual inspection of
the matrix of cosines. This formed our seed set, and was
sufficient to kick off propagation.
However, there is an automated, robust and scalable ap-
proach to the weighted graph matching problem: i.e., using
a state-space search metaheuristic. In Section IV we show
that simulated annealing can easily handle inputs of up size
up to 100 with low false-positive and false-negative rates.
B. Propagation
Our propagation algorithm is adapted from [26]. In fact,
our implementation was simpler; we did not need the more
complex heuristics because the two graphs were substantially
similar to each other, as noted in Section II. However, the
fact that neither graph was fully available made the algorithm
somewhat trickier.
As the algorithm progresses, it maintains a (partial) map-
ping between nodes in the Kaggle graph and nodes in the
true Flickr graph. We iteratively try to extend the mapping
as follows: pick an arbitrary as-yet-unmapped node in the
Kaggle graph, find the “most similar” node in the Flickr
graph, and if they are “sufficiently similar,” they get mapped
to each other.
At a high level, similarity between a Kaggle node and
a Flickr node is defined as cosine similarity between the
already-mapped neighbors of the Kaggle node and the
already-mapped neighbors of the Flickr node (nodes mapped
to each other are treated as identical for the purpose of cosine
comparison).
In Figure 7, the blue nodes have already been mapped.
The similarity between A and B is 2√
3·√3 =
2
3 . Whether or
Fig. 7
DE-ANONYMIZATION PROPAGATION ALGORITHM (SIMPLIFIED).
Input:
vK : a node in the Kaggle graph
vF : a node in the Flickr graph
D: the set of Kaggle nodes de-anonymized so far
map: a partial map from the Kaggle to the Flickrnodes with domain D
CK :
the set of crawled Kaggle nodes, i.e.,
subset of Kaggle nodes having outgoing edges
CF : the set of crawled Flickr nodes
Output: a similarity score
NK ← map[N−(vK) ∩D] ∩ CF
NF ← N−(vF ) ∩map[CK ]
if vK ∈ CK and vF ∈ CF then
NK ← NK ∪map[N+(vK) ∩D]
NF ← NF ∪ (N+(vF ) ∩map[D])
end
return CosineSim(NK , NF )
Algorithm 1: Similarity scores for de-anonymization. Note:
N+(v) and N−(v) denote the out- and in-neighborhood of
a node v respectively.
not edges exist between A and A′ or B and B′ is irrelevant.
Edge directionality combined with the fact that not all
nodes have been crawled introduces some subtleties. Es-
sentially, when comparing a pair of nodes, we ignore the
out-edges of either unless both have been crawled. The full
algorithm is listed as Algorithm 1.
There are two reasons why the similarity between a node
and its image may not be 100%: the contest graph is slightly
different from our newer crawled graph, and the mapping
itself might have inaccuracies. The latter effect is minimal—
the algorithm occasionally revisits already-mapped nodes to
correct errors in the light of more data.
The propagation algorithm was run in two stages. In
the first stage, we de-anonymize high-degree nodes with a
high confidence level. In the second stage, we focus on the
nodes in the test set (that have not yet been de-anonymized)
and relax the confidence threshold, and even allow multiple
candidates per node. Mappings found in this stage do not
feed back into the similarity computation, due to lower
confidence.
The following heuristic criteria define the “sufficiently
similar” criterion in stage 1 of propagation:
• There must be at least k = 4 pairs of common neighbors
mapped to each other;
• The similarity score must be at least θ = 0.5; and
• The difference in similarity scores between the best and
the second-best matches must be at least δ = 0.2.
The parameters k, θ and δ allow us to trade off accuracy
for coverage. In the second stage of propagation, we set
k = 3, eliminate the last criterion, and if there are multiple
matches with a similarity score of 0.5 or more, we report the
best 3 as candidates.
C. Results
The algorithm was implemented in Python and run on a
commodity laptop. Propagation was run in two stages. In the
first stage, we attempted to de-anonymize the high-degree
nodes, specifically, about 34,000 nodes sorted by out-degree
and about 100,000 nodes sorted by in-degree. There was,
of course, some overlap between the two sets. Mappings
were produced for about 120,000 nodes. In the second stage,
we attempted to de-anonymize the nodes in the test set that
hadn’t already been mapped. The first stage took a few hours
and the second stage about 20 minutes.
Of the 120,000 mappings in stage 1, 99.3% were correct.3
At the end of the second stage, mappings were produced
for about 14,000 nodes out of about 17,600 in the test set.
Thus, the coverage was 79.7%. About 7.5% of nodes had
multiple candidates. Of these, the top match was accurate in
the overwhelming majority of cases. Considering only the
top match, the overall accuracy was 97.8%. Of the 8, 960
edges, the coverage was 64.7% (roughly the node coverage
squared), and the accuracy was 95.2%.
IV. GRAPH MATCHING VIA SIMULATED ANNEALING
In Section III-A we showed how to formulate the problem
of seed-identification, the first step of de-anonymization, as
a weighted graph matching problem. To recap, we are given
two graphs with weighted edges, and we are required to
find the mapping between the nodes that minimizes a given
function, such as the sum of absolute differences between
the weights of edges mapped to each other.
Weighted graph matching generalizes its unweighted ver-
sion, inexact graph matching, which in turn generalizes graph
isomorphism. Unsurprisingly, inexact graph matching is NP-
complete [2], and therefore weighted graph matching is NP-
complete as well.
Choice of weights. In our experiments the weight of an
edge is the in-neighbor cosine-similarity score of the pair of
nodes it is incident to. Although there is more information
available that could be incorporated into the edge weights—a
3The “ground truth” mapping between obfuscated node IDs and real
identities provided by Kaggle is not complete—it covers only 36,547 of
the 37,692 nodes with outgoing edges, and 17,130 of the 17,594 nodes
in the test set. The fractions reported in this paragraph are measured with
respect to the available ground truth.
fraction of the Kaggle nodes have out-edges in addition to
in-edges—we choose not to do so for simplicity. Further, one
might imagine incorporating the intuition that higher-degree
nodes are more likely to correspond to higher-degree nodes,
but it is not clear if it is possible to encapsulate this insight
in the form of edge weights.
Simulated annealing is a state-space search “metaheuris-
tic” that is ideal for approximate combinatorial optimiza-
tion. The randomized search begins by exploring the state-
space, placing relatively even probability on all directions,
in order to avoid local optima. As the search proceeds, the
distribution on directions begins to concentrate more tightly
around the gradient direction, converging on greedy hill-
climbing in the limit. A global parameter called temperature,
which gradually decreases with time, controls the trade-
off between exploration and hill-climbing. With a suitable
“cooling schedule,” local optima can be avoided in favor of
the global optimum. For more see the tutorial survey [15].
Our goal in this section is to show that simulated annealing
is a scalable approach to weighted graph matching, using
a real-world dataset. The salient property of this dataset
is that the difference between the graphs to be matched
arises primarily due to the evolution of a social network
with time. We are not claiming that simulated annealing
is necessarily better suited than other approaches such as
genetic algorithms, whether on this type of input or for
weighted graph matching in general. We review the literature
on graph matching in Section VI.
Ground truth and dummy nodes. Ideally, we would like
to measure how close the output of our algorithm is to the
global optimum, as well as how close the global optimum is
to the “ground truth.” However, we do not know the global
optima, for obvious reasons. Therefore we directly measure
the performance of the algorithm against the ground truth.
Another subtlety is that we actually want a partial map-
ping. We handle this by the typical approach of adding
“dummy” nodes to both graphs [7].4 Adding k dummy nodes
to n regular nodes has the effect of finding a mapping of size
n − k. This is because the weights of all edges incident on
dummy nodes are 0, and therefore dummy nodes will never
map to other dummy nodes (since that would result in a
sub-optimal mapping that can be improved in 1 step).
If a mapping between two non-dummy nodes output by
the algorithm is not an actual correspondence, we call it a
false positive. If a correspondence between a pair of nodes
is not output by the algorithm, it is a false negative. Ideally,
we’d like the algorithm to behave as follows. Let m be the
number of pairs of corresponding nodes. Then the number of
false positives should be max(n−m−k, 0) and the number
of false negatives max(m+ k − n, 0).
Potential function. Choosing a potential function is
difficult—simply adding the differences between cosines
gave poor results. For one, Figure 6 shows that a scaling
factor is necessary. Moreover since a few false positives
might be inevitable (with a sufficiently small number of
4This is analogous to slack variables.
Input:
VK , VF :
ordered sets of Kaggle and Flickr nodes
with the same index mapped to each other
DK , DF : sets of dummy nodes
wK , wF : weight functions over edges in Kaggle/Flickr
i: an index; 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ k
α: parameter (set to 0.5)
β: parameter (set to 0.5)
Output: a distance measure
/* vectors of weights of edges between
node $i$ and non-dummy nodes */
σK ← 〈wK(i, j)〉1≤j≤n+k, i 6=j, VK [j]/∈DK
σF ← 〈wF (i, j)〉1≤j≤n+k, i 6=j, VF [j]/∈DF
σ¯K ← mean(σK)
σ¯F ← mean(σF )
function PairDist(x, y)
r ← x > y ? x/y : y/x
return (r − 1)α
return (σ¯K σ¯F )
β
2
∑
j PairDist(σK [j]/σ¯K , σF [j]/σ¯F )
Algorithm 2: Distance for simulated annealing. The poten-
tial function equals the distance summed over each of the in-
dices. Since state transitions involve computing differences
in the potential function, the summation is unnecessary in
practice.
dummies), these might throw off the potential function due
to wildly mismatched cosines. Finally, with the additive
function, edges with higher cosine scores have a higher
impact on the potential; we would like it to be more balanced.
The algorithm we used, listed as Algorithm 2, incorporates
the above rationale. It compares a pair of mapped nodes; the
potential function is the sum of the scores of the pairs of
mapped nodes. We experimented with a few choices for α
and β and found that α = β = 0.5 appears to yield the best
results. The reason for this is not yet clear.
States and cooling schedule. The set of all bijective map-
pings between the two set of nodes (including the dummy
nodes) forms the set of states for simulated annealing.
Initially we start with a random bijection. The “neighbor
states” of a bijection are derived by swapping the images of
a pair of nodes.5
The acceptance probability of a state transition was chosen
in a straightforward manner: P (∆p, T ) = e−
∆p
cT where ∆p
is the change in potential function incurred by the transition,
T is the temperature, and c is a constant. Thus, transitions
to lower-potential states will always be taken, and other
transitions will be taken with a nonzero probability.
T was varied as T = 1t , where t is the time or number
of iterations. The “constant” c is actually dependent on the
number of nodes n: c = c(n) = 20n. These two choices
5We tried “clever” ways of picking neighbors where only pairs of nodes
whose cosine similarity is greater than a threshold are considered. These
choices performed worse than considering all possible pairs.
together constitute the “cooling schedule”.
Fig. 8
ILLUSTRATION OF BIMODALITY. THIS BEHAVIOR IS TYPICAL
Performance. The results are summarized in Figures 9–
11. All observations are medians of (at least) 30 trials. The
median is a more meaningful statistic to report than the mean,
because the distribution is often bimodal, with modes near
0 and n as shown in Figure 8. This behavior is due to one
of two events occurring: the algorithm gets stuck far away
from the global optimum, or it finds the global optimum (or
a point very close to it), which still results in some error
because the global optimum differs from the ground truth by
a small amount.
For n = 20, the algorithm matches the ideal performance
(Figure 9). For n = 40, it is not quite ideal, but comes
close, making no more than three errors (Figure 10). For
n = 80, a different behavior is observed: when the number
of dummies is too small, the algorithm is unable to find
the global optimum in the median case.6 With 8 or more
dummies the algorithm performs well (Figure 11).
Fig. 9
SIMULATED ANNEALING PERFORMANCE: 20 NODES.
For the purposes of the propagation algorithm, the results
6With 0 dummies, the outputs are essentially no better than random
permutations, although this is not shown in the graph.
Fig. 10
SIMULATED ANNEALING PERFORMANCE: 40 NODES.
Fig. 11
SIMULATED ANNEALING PERFORMANCE: 80 NODES.
presented here are more than adequate, considering that it
worked even with 10 seeds, and can tolerate a fraction of
erroneous mappings.
Parameters. As the graphs show, the best results (mea-
sured by false positives + false negatives) are obtained when
the selected number of dummies is (roughly) equal to the
“correct” number of dummies, which is n − m, i.e. the
number of nodes without a corresponding node in the other
graph. Not knowing the optimal number of dummies is not a
problem for our application, since we can try the propagation
algorithm with different sets of seeds and as long as any one
run results in an “epidemic”, de-anonymization is successful.
Nevertheless, in other applications, being able to determine
the right number of dummies automatically might be impor-
tant. In combinatorial optimization problems, approaches that
have fewer knobs that require tweaking are preferable. We
describe two potential ways to accomplish this, both of which
are possible future extensions:
• Pick the number of dummies conservatively and elimi-
nate matches with high distance compared to the aver-
age.
• Run the algorithm in two phases. In the first phase, a
high number of dummies is used, and in the second
phase a low number of dummies is used, but the non-
dummy mapping obtained in the first phase is frozen.
Fig. 12
SIMULATED ANNEALING RUNNING TIME.
Running time. Finally, we present some observations on
running time. Figure 12 shows the number of evaluations of
the potential function, which is the bottleneck step. We im-
plemented a cache (with no expiry) of already-seen mappings
and their potential function values; thus, what is shown on the
y-axis is the number of cache misses. A further optimization
computes only the difference in potential function values, by
exploiting the fact that only one pair of nodes is swapped in
one step, thus decreasing the complexity of potential function
evaluation from quadratic to linear.
It is not clear how to interpret Figure 12. The curve appears
to start off as a parabola and then become a straight line.
We caution against generalizing too much from this figure,
because in general the running time to get an equivalent error
rate is likely to depend heavily on the nature of the data.
V. LINK PREDICTION
A. Use of voting to increase edge coverage
As stated earlier, de-anonymization covered 64.7% of the
test cases in the test set. Recall that some nodes are not
deterministically de-anonymized; multiple candidate matches
are produced instead. We now describe how we leverage this
in link prediction.
The idea behind voting is very simple. Let vK denote
a Kaggle node, and C(vK) denote vK’s de-anonymization
candidates, i.e., potential Flickr nodes that correspond to vK .
Given an edge (a, b) in the test set, suppose |C(a)| 6= 0 and
|C(b)| 6= 0. Then the edge (a, b) has |C(a)| · |C(b)| possible
de-anonymization candidates. If all candidates unanimously
vote 0, i.e., none of these candidate edges exist in the Flickr
graph, then we output the prediction 0. Conversely, if all
candidates unanimously vote 1, we output the prediction 1.
To exploit the full power of voting, we performed the fol-
lowing additional steps to the de-anonymization algorithm:
1) Prune the de-anonymization output by confidence score. 2)
Among the remaining nodes, run stage 2 of the propagation
algorithm with the “sufficiently similar” criterion completely
Input:
ET : Test set
EF : Set of edges in the Flickr graph
D: set of uniquely de-anonymized nodes
map: a 1-1 de-anonymization mapping from Kaggleto Flickr nodes with domain D
C(v): set of de-anonymization candidates for Kaggle node v
Output: A prediction for each edge in ET
foreach (a, b) ∈ ET do
if a ∈ D and b ∈ D then /* DA */
output (map[a],map[b]) ∈ EF ?1 : 0
else if C(a) 6= ∅ and C(b) 6= ∅ then /* Vote */
pred←
1 if (α, β) ∈ EF ∀α ∈ C(a), β ∈ C(b)
0 if (α, β) /∈ EF ∀α ∈ C(a), β ∈ C(b)
ML score o.w.
output pred
else output ML score ; /* ML */
end
Algorithm 3: Combining de-anonymization and machine
learning.
eliminated, thereby encouraging the algorithm to include
even less likely candidates. As a result, some of the nodes
have large numbers of candidates. This is not a drawback—
since we adopt a unanimous voting strategy, having more
candidates ensures that the predictions are more confident.
Naturally, this gives an almost complete coverage of the
nodes and edges, specifically 96.0% node coverage and
92.6% edge coverage. Of these 57.0% of edges had unique
candidates; we applied voting to the other 35.6%. As shown
in Table III, voting produced unanimous results for 18.7%
of the 35.6% of edges.
Table I is a breakdown of the number of edges and non-
edges found by the de-anonymization and voting strategy.
One interesting observation is that the de-anonymization
algorithm was able to determine more edges than non-edges,
while the voting strategy uncovered only non-edges, 98.1%
of which are true non-edges. This is not surprising, due to the
following two reasons. First, the de-anonymization algorithm
has a better coverage on higher-degree nodes. Second, we use
a unanimous voting strategy to ensure high confidence. When
a test edge has multiple de-anonymization candidates, it is
highly likely that some candidates will vote no, as two nodes
picked randomly from the graph are much more likely not to
have an edge based on a simple calculation. Therefore, it is
much more likely to uncover a non-edge through unanimous
voting than to uncover an edge.
Algorithm 3 formally describes how we combine de-
anonymization with machine learning predictions.
Machine learning. We implemented 25 features (and
their variations) capturing neighborhood characteristics up
to 4 hops away. These features include Adamic/Adar [19],
Jaccard [19], localized random walks, node degrees, local
TABLE I
RESULTS: breakdown of the number of edges and non-edges predicted by
the de-anonymization and voting algorithms.
Method #(%) of edges predicted #(%) of non-edges predicted
DA 2868 (56.2%) 2240 (43.8%)
Voting 0 (0%) 1677 (100%)
clustering coefficients, whether the reverse edge exists, and
so on. For a subset of the above features, we also imple-
mented different variations with different parametrizations
(e.g., hop count), and using in-degrees, out-degrees, or both.
We ran the Random Forest [8] classifier on top of the 25
selected features. We created a training and validation set
using the “ground truth” obtained from de-anonymization.
The training set contains 3, 000 ∼ 4, 200 examples, and the
validation set contains roughly 1, 000 ∼ 2, 000 examples.
Table II depicts the performance of the machine learning
algorithm, and selected features. Notably, among the features
we tried, the best stand-alone feature is the localized random
walk. Given a test edge (a, b), we perform a random walk
starting at node a for a limited number of hops, and compute
how likely it is to reach node b in the process. To compute
this probability, we implemented an approximate version
of 3-4 rounds of matrix multiplication of the PageRank
algorithm, starting at node a. The localized random walk
feature achieves an AUC of 0.912 and 0.924 when the
maximum number of hops is 3 and 4 respectively.
The Random Forest algorithm achieved an AUC of 0.935
to 0.945 on the validation set. On the entire Kaggle test set,
it achieved an AUC of 0.953; however, this number has to
be taken with a grain of salt, as we used part of the test set
for training (see Figure 13). The classifier performed worse
on the ML set which was not covered by de-anonymization
or voting, with an AUC of 0.881. Therefore, an interesting
observation is that the subset of test edges that are more
difficult to de-anonymize also turns out to be the set relatively
hard for link prediction (through ML). This is likely due to
the fact that these nodes lack sufficient information necessary
for de-anonymization or accurate link prediction.
Voting
ML
Train
Validation
DA
Fig. 13
BREAKDOWN OF THE KAGGLE TEST SET.
TABLE II
MACHINE LEARNING RESULTS.
Method AUC (test set) AUC (ML set)
Adamic/Adar 0.835 0.760
Jaccard 0.851 0.775
Localized Random Walk (3 hops) 0.912 0.834
Localized Random Walk (4 hops) 0.924 0.865
Random Forest (25 features) 0.953∗ 0.881
*: Part of the test set was used to train based on the de-anonymization result.
TABLE III
RESULTS.
Method % Edges Covered Accuracy AUC
DA 57.0%∗ 0.987 –
Voting 18.7% 0.981 –
ML 24.3% – 0.881∗∗
Overall 100% 0.981
* Based on a pruned version of the de-anonymization result.
** AUC on the ML set was 0.881; but AUC on the validation set was
0.935 ∼ 0.945. The ML set is a hard subset both for de-anonymization
and machine learning since it is biased toward low-degree nodes.
VI. RELATED WORK
Link prediction. Several prior works study the problem of
social network link prediction through graph structural analy-
sis [19], [23], [10]. Notably, our link prediction algorithm and
those of other top teams leveraged several features proposed
by Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg [19]. Unfortunately, the large
size of the graph precluded the use of all features described
therein when running on a commodity computer [11].
Other teams in the contest achieved impressive results
using pure link prediction. In particular, Cukierski, Yang,
and Hamner finished second, and their link prediction al-
gorithm involved running Random Forests over 94 selected
features [11] and achieved an extraordinary AUC of 0.969.
Social network de-anonymization. Backstrom et al. [6]
showed how to de-anonymize specific nodes and edges in
a social network by searching for patterns in subgraphs
of small size (logarithmic; in practice, around 7 nodes).
Narayanan and Shmatikov studied de-anonymization of a
social network on a large scale by using a different social
network as auxiliary data [26].
Inexact graph matching is a well-studied problem that
arises in diverse applications, primarily image recognition.
Bengoetxea’s thesis [7] surveys numerous approaches to
solving it, including genetic algorithms, simulated anneal-
ing, expectation maximization, decision trees, and neural
networks. It is possible that some of these techniques would
extend to weighted graph matching.
Weighted graph matching has been studied in [29], [4].
These papers are concerned with finding the optimal solution
rather than an approximation, and therefore their techniques
only work for small numbers of nodes.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our primary goal for participating in the Challenge was
to raise attention to the ever-present possibility of de-
anonymization in such contests. More broadly one might
ask whether contests should discourage the use of outside
information in general—trading off the benefits of leveraging
outside information to genuinely improve the outcomes of
data mining, and preventing cheating—and what technical
or policy means could be used to limit such information.
In addition to undermining the aim of the contest, which
was to advance the state-of-the-art in machine learning,
de-anonymization also has privacy implications (although
these did not arise in this contest). For these reasons, it is
important to think about how to prevent de-anonymization in
future contests. One factor that greatly affects both risks—
in opposite directions—is whether the underlying data is
already publicly available. If it is, then there is likely no
privacy risk; however, it furnishes a ready source of high-
quality data to game the contest. On the other hand, if the
data is not public, then it can only be exploited by cross-
referencing it through de-anonymization with another dataset
of the same type (or with some of the same attributes)
that is public.7 While this presents a significant privacy
risk, imperfect correlation between the two datasets makes it
unclear whether there is a threat to the fidelity of the contest.
Focusing on the threat of de-anonymization to the con-
test, incorporating a restriction on the use of external data
in the rules is a necessary step, but arguably insufficient,
since less scrupulous contestants may attempt to apply de-
anonymization anyway. We can see two possible ways to
combat this threat. The first is the approach taken by the
Netflix Prize—require teams qualifying for prizes to produce
source code and human-readable descriptions of algorithms.
The Netflix Prize stipulated that the verification process
would “ensure that the provided algorithm description and
source code could reasonably have generated the prediction
sets submitted.”
The loophole in this approach is the possibility of over-
fitting. While source-code verification would undoubtedly
catch a contestant who achieved their results using de-
anonymization alone, the more realistic threat is that of de-
anonymization being used to bridge a small gap. In this
scenario, a machine learning algorithm would be trained
on the test set, the correct results having been obtained
via de-anonymization. Since successful ML solutions are
composites of numerous algorithms, and consequently have a
huge number of parameters, it should be possible to conceal
a significant amount of overfitting in this manner.
Another approach is to attempt to prevent the possibility of
de-anonymization. This is a daunting task: a long line of re-
search has demonstrated the feasibility of de-anonymization
on various datasets [27], [21], [13], [17], [25], [26], [14],
[1] and theoretical evidence exists for the impossibility of
de-anonymization of high-dimensional data [3].
Several papers have claimed to provide k-anonymity, or
variants thereof, for graphs [16], [20], [9], [30]. These have
only been evaluated against graphs with a small number of
nodes and small average degree. Further, they only consider
7For example, Narayanan and Shmatikov were able to re-identify
anonymized records in the Netflix Prize dataset with user accounts on IMDb
via their public movie reviews [25].
the threat of adversaries with restricted types of auxiliary
information, which in particular does not include global
information such as another graph that is structurally related
to the target graph. For these reasons we do not believe
these techniques are effective ways to anonymize social
networking graphs.
Finally, differential privacy offers a potential method to
bypass the need for anonymization [12]. McSherry and
Mironov show how the Netflix Prize contest could have been
run by releasing a differentially private dataset (primarily,
a sanitized item-item covariance matrix) instead of raw
user data [22]. The drawbacks of this approach are that it
would restrict the class of machine learning algorithms, and
may require a shift from the “release-and-forget” model to
an online privacy-preserving computation model, especially
due to the difficulty of generating synthetic datasets that
preserve differential privacy [28]. Nevertheless, differential
privacy remains essentially the only mathematically sound
methodology for provably resisting de-anonymization.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS & OPEN PROBLEMS
We have described a de-anonymization attack on link pre-
diction contests, which was used in the winning entry to the
IJCNN 2011 Social Network Challenge run by Kaggle.com.
While the competition dataset was scrubbed of user iden-
tities, the revelation that the graph had been obtained by
crawling Flickr proved sufficient for our attack. Using our
own crawl of Flickr, we were able to successfully de-
anonymize 64.7% of the test edge-set. And by training a
Random Forest classifier on standard link prediction features
of the training plus de-anonymized test sets, we were able
to achieve a winning test AUC of 0.981.
We made several technical contributions in developing our
attack. We introduced a new approach to seed-identification,
which is applicable to weighted graph matching more gen-
erally. We also described how to combine the results of
de-anonymization and link prediction: the link prediction
training set is augmented by the partially de-anonymized
test set, and probabilistic predictions from both processes
are used together.
The success of our attack on the Social Network Chal-
lenge has important consequences for the future of such
contests. We have argued that forbidding outside data sources
and requiring source code submissions may not eliminate
the problem. Ruling out de-anonymization while preserving
meaningful utility remains an open question.
Identifying the source of anonymized social graph data is
also an interesting research direction, although it is likely
that global characteristics such as joint degree distribution
would suffice to differentiate online social networks in a
straightforward manner.
While previous work on social network link prediction
mainly exploits the structure of the graph itself [19], [23],
[10], our work suggests a promising new direction, namely,
incorporating the vast amount of information publicly avail-
able on the web. Our de-anonymization approach may be
regarded an extreme case; more generally, it may be possible
to leverage statistical or aggregate information gleaned from
the web to improve link prediction. It would also be inter-
esting to investigate how to incorporate semantic information
attached to nodes and edges into link prediction.
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